Defamation: Public Website Postings

Posted in Internet Law on December 27, 2012

Chaker v. Mateo, (Fourth District, October 4, 2012) — Cal.Rptr.3d —-, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,371, 2012 WL 4711885

A man who owned a forensics business filed an action for defamation against his former girlfriend, her mother and others, alleging that they had posted defamatory material about him on a social networking website and on a website where member of the public can comment on the reliability and honesty of various providers of goods and services. The complaint alleged that the defendants had posted accusations that he was, inter alia, a criminal and a “deadbeat dad” and “is into illegal activities.”

The former girlfriend’s mother filed a motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.15, (the Anti-SLAPP law), contending that the plaintiff’s claims arose from her exercise of the right to free speech. The trial court granted the motion and the court of appeal affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that there was a probability of prevailing on his claim, in that it could not be concluded that the comments would be interpreted as anything more than name-calling:

In this context it is difficult to conclude Mateo’s alleged embellishments, to the effect Chaker picks up street walkers and homeless drug addicts and is a dead beat dad, would be interpreted by the average Internet reader as anything more than the insulting name calling—in the vein of “she hires worthless relatives,” “he roughed up patients” or “he’s a crook”—which one would expect from someone who had an unpleasant personal or business experience with Chaker and was angry with him rather than as any provable statement of fact. In this regard, we note the insults are generalized in that they lack any specificity as to the time or place of Chaker’s supposed behavior; the absence of such specificity is a yet a further signal to the reader there is no factual basis for the accusations. Thus, we are unable to distinguish these insults from the nonactionable ones posted in Summit Bank and Krinsky, and like the courts in those cases, we conclude these statements are nonactionable opinions.

The only statement which might arguably fall outside the scope of nonactionable opinion or epithet is the statement Mateo is a criminal. However, that statement is true. As the trial court noted, the fact Chaker’s conviction was later expunged did not prevent others from making true statements about his criminal history.

In sum, Chaker did not meet the minimal burden required to show he was likely to prevail on his defamation claim, as required by the second step of analysis under the Anti–Slapp Law.

“In this context it is difficult to conclude Mateo’s alleged embellishments, to the effect Chaker picks up street walkers and homeless drug addicts and is a dead beat dad, would be interpreted by the average Internet reader as anything more than the insulting name calling—in the vein of “she hires worthless relatives,” “he roughed up patients” or “he’s a crook”—which one would expect from someone who had an unpleasant personal or business experience with Chaker and was angry with him rather than as any provable statement of fact. In this regard, we note the insults are generalized in that they lack any specificity as to the time or place of Chaker’s supposed behavior; the absence of such specificity is a yet a further signal to the reader there is no factual basis for the accusations. Thus, we are unable to distinguish these insults from the nonactionable ones posted in Summit Bank and Krinsky, and like the courts in those cases, we conclude these statements are nonactionable opinions.

The only statement which might arguably fall outside the scope of nonactionable opinion or epithet is the statement Mateo is a criminal. However, that statement is true. As the trial court noted, the fact Chaker’s conviction was later expunged did not prevent others from making true statements about his criminal history.

In sum, Chaker did not meet the minimal burden required to show he was likely to prevail on his defamation claim, as required by the second step of analysis under the Anti–Slapp Law.”